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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Navy supply system support provided 
to the Naval shipyards. Maintenance Support Managers at Naval 
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) have indicated that Navy 
industrial activities desire NAVSUP to buy and issue material 
to meet the Required Delivery Date (RDD). Shipyard planning 
activities' material forecasting procedures and the entire 
requisition process were examined. A review was also 
conducted of efforts at the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) 
to ensure industrial requisitions met the RDD. The results of 
the review showed that the supply system cannot automatically 
match all forecasted requirements against the shipyard 
requisitions. In addition, shipyard planners are not aware of 
the UMMIPS time standards for requisition processing. One 
recommendation is for SPCC to increase the requisition match 
rate by expanding the number of possible ways to match 
industrial requisitions to the Pre-Planned Requirements (PPR). 
Another is to have shipyard Supply Departments conduct UMMIPS 
training sessions so that better RDD values are assigned by 
personnel involved with the requisition process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The mission of logistics is to get the right goods or 
services to the right place, at the right time, and in the 
desired condition in order to satisfy the needs of the 
customer (Ballou, 1992, p.5). One of the principal areas of 
support desired by Naval Shipyards is material receipt by the 
Reguired Delivery Date (RDD). The RDD is important because 
key event schedules for completion of maintenance are critical 
for the shipyard to meet its goals of returning a ship to 
active service on time and within budget. 
In February 1990, the Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP) began to develop a customer-based management system 
that would more effectively measure the effect of supply 
support on maintenance efficiency, stock replenishment and 
readiness reguirements. As a consequence, a survey of all 
industrial customers was conducted in order to obtain a 
maintenance perspective. 
The industrial customers questioned in this survey 
indicated that NAVSUP should be buying and issuing material to 
meet their specified RDD. To accomplish this, NAVSUP directed 
the formation of Process Action Teams (PAT) to determine the 
extent to which RDDs are met, realign the buying and material 
management processes to prioritize by the RDD, and to work 
closely with all industrial customers in order to constantly 
improve the process. 
The first product of this process was the development of 
the MILSTEP (Military Supply and Transportation Evaluation 
Procedures) RDD Effectiveness Report which is now sent to all 
industrial customers on a quarterly basis. MILSTEP is 
designed to produce uniform DOD-wide logistics performance 
measurement reports to be used in evaluating performance of 
each segment of the requisition pipeline. 
The MILSTEP report contains requisition data for all 
activities such as SPCC, ASO, DLA and GSA. A current weakness 
with this report is that it uses the actual shipment date, 
document identifier "AS1" as found in the Transaction History- 
File, to compare with the RDD. There is no allowance for 
transportation time and receipt takeup time by the 
requisitioner. Despite this limitation, Figure 1 gives an 
example of the data provided by this report. The percentages 
reflect the effectiveness of the supply system in meeting the 
RDD's of Norfolk Naval Shipyard, typically between 80-90%. 
On-Time Performance 
Jan        Feb        Mar        Apr        May        Jun 
Month -1994 
Figure 1.  Required Delivery Date On-Time Performance. 
(From NAVSUP Corporate Information System, August 1994 
In order for senior managers and employees to have access 
to corporate statistics, The RDD On-Time Performance Report 
has been added to the NAVSUP Corporate Information System 
(CIS). With CIS, managers are able to obtain data either on 
overall RDD effectiveness or stratified by number of days 
late.  Additionally, the data can be further broken down by 
UIC (Unit Identification Code) or by Cognizance Code (COG 
1R,1H,7H/R/E). 
1. UMMIPS Time Standards 
UMMIPS (Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority 
System) prescribes DOD policy for determining the priority 
ranking of material requirements for all DOD components. This 
policy applies to the requisition, issue, and movement of all 
material with time standards stated for each segment. These 
time standards are supposed to be the upper bound on actual 
times for each segment. 
2. DMRD 915 
In 1989 Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 915 
addressed several proposals which focused on reducing DOD 
transportation costs. One of the issues discussed was an 
initiative to change the Issue Priority Group (IPG) policy. 
At that time, the priority system not only established the 
criticality of the requisitioner, but also dictated the mode 
of transportation. Often the criticality is replenishment of 
the requisitioner's inventory, and immediate shipment is not 
required. Studies conducted by DOD have indicated that over 
90% of the high priority requisitions were not time sensitive. 
As a result, unnecessary depot processing and transportation 
costs are being incurred. The suggestion was to use the IPG 
for allocation of inventory and to establish a separate 
transportation priority system. 
As a consequence of DMRD 915, DOD Regulation 4140.1R, 
known as the "Super Reg", was issued in January 1993. This 
document provided guidance for the uniform management of all 
DOD material. One of the policies established by this 
regulation stated that the customers of the logistics system 
will utilize UMMIPS to identify the relative priorities of 
their demands for material and separately identify the 
response time of the distribution and transportation systems 
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in setting their RDDs. (The details of this regulation 
concerning UMMIPS will be discussed in the next chapter.) All 
supply activities were then directed to design their systems 
to meet the service levels dictated by the customer's priority 
designator, RDD, and approved project codes. If a customer 
has a specific date on which delivery is reguired, the date is 
entered as the RDD. Unless the RDD is unreasonable, the 
customer should expect delivery on or before the RDD. On the 
other hand, if a customer has a high priority reguisition, but 
does not specify an RDD (i.e., the RDD is blank) the customer 
should expect the total time from order placement to delivery 
to be within the total order and ship time specified in the 
new UMMIPS times standards in the Super Reg. 
3. OPNAV Instruction 4614.IF versus the Super Reg 
During the course of research, several problems have been 
noted with the UMMIPS procedures as interpreted by Navy 
activities. The initial guiding instruction was OPNAV 
Instruction 4614.IF, dated 15 April 1983, which implemented 
DOD UMMIPS policy for use within the Navy. This instruction 
does not have the same time standards as the Super Reg for 
each segment of the reguisition pipeline and it does not 
emphasize RDD as vigorously. Additionally, in discussions 
with shipyard planners and supply personnel (the customers), 
it was discovered that the majority of them were familiar with 
OPNAV instruction 4614.IF. However, these same individuals 
did not know what the old or new time standards were for 
ordering material from the supply system. 
B.  OBJECTIVES 
In order to suggest appropriate improvements, this thesis 
examines the material support provided by the Navy's supply 
system to the Naval shipyards and focuses on the ability of 
this system to respond to the shipyards' requirements by the 
RDD. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To achieve the objectives, the following question was 
posed: Does the Navy's supply system provide a shipyard's 
material requirements by the required delivery date? To 
answer this basic research question, the following subsidiary 
questions were asked: 
1. How are material requirements forecasted for ships 
in overhaul? 
2. How are requisitions matched to preplanned 
requirements? 
3. How do the shipyards order repair parts? 
4. How do the shipyards decide on the RDD? 
5. What is NAVSEA doing to improve the way shipyards 
do business? 
6. How are material requirements processed in each 
segment of the requisition pipeline? 
7. What are the time standards for each segment and 
are they being met by the supply system? 
8. What actions are being taken by SPCC to meet the 
needs of their industrial customers? 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The information presented in this research effort was 
obtained through personal interviews of key individuals at the 
Naval Supply Systems Command, the Naval Sea Systems Command, 
the Navy Ships Parts Control Center, the Defense Logistics 
Agency, and the Naval Shipyards at Norfolk, Puget Sound and 
Long Beach. MILSTEP statistics for each segment of the 
requisition pipeline and Supply Material Availability (SMA) 
data was provided by the Operations Research Division of SPCC. 
The literature utilized in this research was obtained 
from multiple sources, including the Naval Postgraduate School 
Library, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), and Defense 
and Navy Department reports, manuals and instructions. 
E. CHAPTER PREVIEW 
The next chapter describes the procedures used by the 
shipyard Planning Activities to forecast material requirements 
for ships entering an availability. This includes a 
description of Pre-Planned Requirements (PPRs) for Navy 
managed material and Special Program Requirements (SPRs) for 
DLA managed items. Case Studies are used to describe the 
problems of matching PPRs/SPRs to drawdown requisitions and 
the inaccuracies of the process. Chapter II concludes with a 
description of an effort to reengineer the shipyards' 
operating procedures through a program called AIM (Advanced 
Industrial Management). 
Chapter III examines the entire requisition process from 
requirement generation and RDD determination through material 
receipt. Chapter III concentrates on the procedures and times 
to complete each step of the process. This examination shows 
a process which is complex and controlled by different 
organizations. 
Chapter IV investigates the initiatives taken by SPCC to 
manage backordered industrial requisitions to meet RDD when 
the Estimated Material Availability (EAD) is beyond the RDD. 
Chapter IV also describes SPCC's surcharge and the financial 
impact foregone by SPCC when shipyard RDDs are not met. 
Chapter V summarizes this thesis, draws conclusions from 
the research and makes recommendations for improvements. 
II. MAINTENANCE MATERIAL FORECASTING 
In order to have repair parts available, especially parts 
with long lead times, forecasts are made to alert the supply- 
system so that these parts are available by the Required 
Delivery Date (RDD) to support maintenance availabilities. 
This chapter will show the complexities of the process and 
disparities with submitted requisitions. The final section 
will describe a program initiated by Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) to overcome the problems discussed by improving 
business practices and operations in Naval shipyards. 
A.   PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
The advance planning activities for ships and submarines 
undergoing overhaul commences four to six years before the 
scheduled start of a specific ship's availability. The 
planning agent responsible for surface ships is known as the 
PERA (Planning, Engineering and Repair Activity) and for 
submarines, SUBMEPP (Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, 
Planning and Procurement). (Ford, 1994) 
Results of the PERA's planning process include the 
Maintenance Forecast tapes, which are forwarded to Ships Parts 
Control Center (SPCC), and separate advanced planning 
documents used by the shipyards to support their material 
identification and procurement efforts. The PERA forecast 
integrates the following major data elements in order to 
predict what, when, where and how much material is required to 
support a particular availability: 
a. Availability Start Data (ASD): A current listing of 
ship's depot availability schedules. 
b. Configuration Data:  Data provided from the Ships 
Configuration and Logistic Support Information System 
(SCLSIS); provides ship specific equipment and component 
data, such as Allowance Parts List (APL) numbers. 
c. Maintenance Planning Data (MPD): Based on specific 
ship class; indicates what system is to be maintained, the 
planned task, which industrial activity is assigned the task 
and the date it is scheduled for accomplishment. 
d. Material Files (MF):  Identifies the parts required 
to complete a maintenance action and assigns a Probability 
of Use (POU) factor.  (Fitzgibbon, 1994) 
The POU is an engineering risk assessment, expressed as 
a percentage, which reflects the PERA's judgement for the 
probability that a certain part will need to be replaced while 
accomplishing a particular maintenance action. This POU 
factor is the key element in determining how the supply system 
will support a forecasted requirement. For example, a repair 
part with a POU of .40 indicates that this particular part 
will be required 40% of the time to accomplish a specified 
task.  (NAVSEA/NAVSUP JPAT Report, 19 93) 
The planning activities then evaluate the risk assessment 
against the range and depth of each Class Maintenance Plan 
(CMP) and separate the material requirements into two forecast 
classifications: Mandatory - relatively high POU; Contingent - 
relatively low POU. Table 1 shows the variance between the 
planning activities as to assigning POU factors. 
B. MANDATORY MATERIAL FORECASTS 
Magnetic tapes with material forecasts as mandatory are 
forwarded to SPCC quarterly. Each tape covers a five-year 
window and specifies the items, quantity per hull for a 
particular availability, assigned shipyard, and the start 
date. At SPCC the tape is loaded into the Program 
Requirements System Interface Module (PRISM). PRISM validates 
the data fields and processes the requirements for Navy and 
DLA managed material. From this process Planned Program 
Requirements (PPRs) for Navy-managed material and Special 
Program Requirements (SPRs) for DLA-managed material are 






Material POU Classificatic 
Manager 
SPCC >= .5 
<  .5 
Mandatory 
Contingent 
DLA >= .2 







DLA >= .5 
<  .5 
Mandatory 
Contingent 
SPCC >= .5 
<  .5 
Mandatory 
Contingent 
DLA >= .5 
<  .5 
Mandatory 
Contingent 
Table 1. Classification Criteria by Planning Activities 
(From NAVSEA/NAVSUP JPAT Report, 199 3) 
1. Navy Managed Material 
The PRISM program will accept forecasted mandatory 
requirements if the Availability Start Date (ASD) falls beyond 
the particular item's Procurement Lead Time (PLT). If the ASD 
falls within the PLT, the forecasted requirement may also be 
accepted, provided there are sufficient on-hand or due-in 
assets available to support normal fleet demand or other 
previously established programmed requirements. PRISM in both 
cases determines a Best Estimated Delivery Date (BEDD), which 
is the estimated RDD for the requirement, considers 
adds/changes/deletes to the overlay program and assigns 
"reject PLT" to those forecasted requirements that cannot be 
supported by the start of the availability.  Valid material 
requirements accepted by PRISM are then processed as PPRs. 
(Port, 1994) 
Planned Program Requirements (PPRs) are non-recurring 
additive requirement levels used at SPCC in the Supply Demand 
Review (SDR) process to ensure availability of material when 
requisitions are submitted and to enable accurate computation 
of budget requirements. Each PPR cites a NUN or NICN, item 
quantity, document number or PPR control number, RDD, UIC of 
the ship or repair activity, and stock point to which material 
is be positioned. Additionally, each PPR is assigned a three- 
character 500 or 600 series project code to identify the 
purpose for which it is being established. (NAVSEA/NAVSUP 
JPAT Report, 1993) 
The Supply Demand Review (SDR) process is a computerized 
method of comparing assets and requirements to determine if a 
supply action is required. The SDR application is run every 
two weeks and produces a Consolidated Stock Status Report 
(CSSR) which reflects asset status and includes SDR 
recommendations for buys and/or disposals.  (NAVSUP P-553) 
2. DLA Managed Material 
Mandatory forecast requirements identified by the PRISM 
program as DLA COG are processed as Special Program 
Requirements (SPRs). A SPR is defined as a forecast 
requirement required to support a special program or project 
which is of a non-recurring nature. The SPR is electronically 
transmitted from SPCC to DLA via AUTODIN. The SPR 
transmission covers a window of 90 calendar days to three 
years in advance of the requirement and it specifies 
information similar to the PPR, such as the NUN and project 
code, etc.  (DOD 4000.25-2-M) 
DLA ICPs measure the size of the requirement being 
forecasted to determine its acceptability in terms of the risk 
of long supply being generated.  This measurement requires 
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consideration of the size of the forecasted quantity in 
relation to the normal demand estimated for the item, the cost 
of this quantity, supply status of the forecasted item, 
funding capability of the ICP, accuracy of past forecasts, and 
the degree of assurance that requisitions will follow. 
Acceptance under these criteria will generate a "PA" status 
code which means the forecasted quantity will be satisfied 
within appropriate Uniform Material Movement and Issue 
Priority (UMMIPS) time standards.  (DOD 4000.25-2-M) 
Other status codes generated by DLA include "PB" and 
"PX". A "PB" status code means that although the forecasted 
quantity is accepted to the requirements file, DLA requires a 
requisition to be submitted at least the procurement lead time 
before the RDD in order for them to meet the RDD. Reject Code 
"PX" indicates an item which has an Acquisition Advice Code 
"J" meaning it is not stocked by DLA and that the Industrial 
Activity will need to submit a funded requisition in time to 
permit procurement. Other SPR reject codes are used to 
indicate duplicate requirements, items coded obsolete, or that 
the source of supply is local procurement. All of the 
response codes discussed above are processed by SPCC and are 
provided as feedback to the respective PERA. 
In September 1990, in response to restrictions on stock 
fund investment, DLA amended its use of SPRs in the 
forecasting process. While still accepting SPRs into the ICP 
program, SPR quantities regardless of their Acceptance Code, 
would not automatically be included in its forecast for 
procurement. DLA Item Managers would consider the SPR 
quantities as indicators of potential demand with priorities 
and funding going towards filling demand-based requirements 
first.  (Rodenmeyer, 1994) 
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C. CONTINGENCY MATERIAL FORECASTS 
The PERA produces forecast tapes for Contingency material 
under each Planned Maintenance Program twice a year and 
forwards these to SPCC. In general, the contingency forecast 
quantities are computed as follows: 
QTY = (SHIPS/FYQ) x (APLS/SHIP) X (NSNs/APL) X POU; 
where "SHIPS/FYQ" equals the quantity of hulls having at least 
one component with a Planned Maintenance Requirement (PMR) in 
a specific fiscal year quarter; 
"APLS/SHIP" equals the quantity of components per ship with 
the application PMR; and 
"NSNs/APL" equals the quantity of a specific NSN contained in 
an APL. (NAVSEA/NAVSUP JPAT Report, 1993) 
In order to add some control in the process for 
Contingency material, NAVSEA has indicated that material with 
a unit cost in excess of $5000 shall be separately identified 
and approved by the Engineering and Planning Officer, after 
consultation with the customer. Additionally, material having 
a unit cost in excess of $2000 shall be approved by the 
Engineering and Planning Officer. (NAVSEA Material Policy 2b) 
1. Navy Managed Material 
The contingency forecast is supported at SPCC by 
establishing a Numeric Stockage Objective (NSO) or safety 
stock. Unlike mandatory forecast tapes, contingency material 
forecasts for Navy managed items only cite the NUN or NICN 
and 20 separate quarters of forecasted demand. This 
forecasted demand is factored by the POU for all requirements 
forecasted for each ship of the class for a unique task/APL 
combination.  (McFadden, 1994) 
The NSO computation formula is as follows: 
(a) For 1H COG items with only one APL application, the 
quarterly required quantity will be computed by multiplying 
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the POU by the total number of requirements for that item 
during the quarter.  For example: 
POU        QTR QTY       Factored Quarterly QTY 
.2X8        =        1.6 
In this example, 1.6 would be provided as the quarter's 
requirement.  For items with multiple APL applications, the 
quarterly quantity is weighted by the value of the POU and the 
total required quantities for that respective quarter.  For 
example: 




.3 X 2 
.8 X 3 
.4 X 1 
3.4 
In this example, 3.4 would be provided as the quarter's 
requirement. 
(b) For Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), the calculation is as 
follows: 
CH  *  (1-SR)  +  (CHHSRUT) 
L 
where;  CH = Changeouts over the Procurement lead time 
L = Procurement lead time in quarters 
SR = Repair survival rate 
T = Turnaround time in quarters 
and the following guidelines apply to rounding: 
a. when the result is 0, establish a NSO of 0 
b. when the result is >0 but <=1, establish a NSO of 1 
c. when the result is >1 but <=1.4, establish a NSO of 1 
d. when the result is >1.4 but <=2, establish a NSO of 2 
e. for results >2, use same rounding criteria as shown in 
(c) and (d).  (McFadden, 1994) 
The NSO quantity is loaded into the SPCC UICP Program and 
a low limit Reorder Level (ROL) is recomputed for the 
forecasted item. For example, if a particular item has a ROL 
13 
quantity of three based on recurring demand, and a Contingency 
Forecast generated an NSO quantity of five, then the forecast 
will drive a buy for an additional two items. Likewise, if 
the demand based ROL quantity is ten, and the forecast 
generated NSO quantity was five, the low limit ROL would 
remain ten, and the NSO forecast would have no impact. 
(NAVSEA/NAVSUP JPAT Report, 1993) 
A deficiency in the process occurs when an item is common 
to two or more Class Maintenance Plan forecasts. In this 
instance each successive Contingency Forecast quantity will 
overlay the previous NSO quantity and may not impact the low 
limit ROL.  (NAVSEA/NAVSUP JPAT Report, 1993) 
In response to increased restrictions on Stock Fund 
investments, SPCC has initiated a stringent manual review of 
high value Planned Maintenance NSOs and compared the previous 
two years' recorded demand history with the forecasted 
requirements to amend the projected quantities as appropriate. 
SPCC further intends to extend this review to include Planned 
Maintenance NSOs with a low POU and IMECs of 0,1 and 2 (non- 
critical).  (Port, 1994) 
2. DLA Managed Material 
Contingency Maintenance Forecasts for DLA managed 
material is initially processed by SPCC to establish Supply 
Support Requests (SSRs). An SSR is a document or a group of 
documents submitted by SPCC to DLA that provides the projected 
requirements for retail and wholesale stock (DOD 4140.26-M). 
As was the case for Navy-managed Contingency Material, SPCC 
receives forecasts from the Planning Activities. SPCC 
validates the item's stock number and then transmits the 
requirement to DLA as a SSR.  (Port, 1994) 
SSRs are automatically processed in accordance with DLA 
Manual 4140.2, Vol II, to determine the validity of data 
received, the availability of stock numbers, and the status of 
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all available stock numbers. Advice as to acceptance and/or 
rejection of supply support is forwarded to the submitting 
activity (SPCC) within 25 days after receipt. DLA's SSR 
stockage policy for its ICPs to follow is: 
a. When the quantity is greater than five, a buy is 
generated. 
b. When the quantity is less than five, the item will 
be coded non-stocked, unless an activity submits a Weapon 
System Essentiality Code of 1,5,6, or 7 for the item.  In 
these cases, the items will be coded as stocked and DLA will 
buy an insurance quantity of three. 
c. For non-stocked items with no Weapon System 
Essentiality Code, the item is given an acquisition advice 
code of "J" meaning local purchase will be made at the time 
when the item is ordered. 
D.  REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS 
Advanced Planning Documents which have been developed by 
the PERA are provided to the shipyards three to thirty-six 
months prior to the start of a specific ship's availability 
(Ford, 1994). Table 2 provides an indication of the basic 
planning documents provided by SUBMEPP and PERA Surface. 
As can be seen by the various planning documents, the 
shipyard's maintenance material determination process 
commences many months before the start of the scheduled 
Availability or Overhaul. This provides adequate time to 
identify and procure long lead time material, review the 
PERA'S Advance Planning Documents and refine the preliminary 
work packages through the Pre-Overhaul Test and Inspection 
(POT&I) process.  (Fitzgibbon, 1994) 
These POT&Is provide additional information that allows 
refinement of the work package estimates in terms of time, 
cost, and material requirements. The culmination of this 
process leads to the proposed SARP. Approximately 6 months 
before the start of the availability, the Proposed SARP is 
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presented  at  the 
(Fitzgibbon, 1994) 
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Material  List   (MML) 
Job Material A-8 
List   (JML) 
Preliminary  Ship A-12 
Alteration Repair 
Package   (SARP) 
All  authorized work 
for  a   specific  hull 
APL   (Allowance  Parts  List) 
Maintenance  Stds, 
Component  Identification 
Ship Work List 
Identification Number 
(SWILIN1/APL  for  all 
components 
Specifies material  list 
for  Class   "B"   overhaul 
Specifies maintenance 
task,   location and 
number   of  equipments 
Table  2.     Schedule  for Advance Planning Documents. 
(From NAVSEA/NAVSUP  JPAT  Report,   1993) 
The WDC is chaired by the Type Commander (TYCOM) and 
attended by PERA, shipyard and ship's personnel. Available 
TYCOM maintenance funds are matched to selected work items 
included in the Proposed SARP to form the Authorized Work 
Package for a given ship and availability. At the conclusion 
of the WDC, the TYCOM authorizes the shipyards to start 
acguiring material to support the Approved Work Package (AWP). 
(Ford,   1994) 
Once the AWP is received by the cognizant shipyard Type 
Desk, it is issued to the Planning and Estimating (P&E) 
Division to allocate into work segments. To identify the 
actual material requirements the Shipyard planners and 
estimators  utilize the  following references:   Allowance Parts 
^hese figures represent the number of months before the start 
of the availability. 
16 
Lists (APLs), PERA's Advanced Planning Products, Technical 
Repair Standards (TRSs), equipment drawings, technical 
manuals, Equipment Guide Lists (EGLs), and historical ordering 
data collected from similar hull types (Lee, 1994). 
After a ship's arrival, additional material requirements 
are identified through the Open and Inspect Records (OIR) 
process. The "Open and Inspect" portion of the Job Tasking is 
a very significant phase of the material identification 
process as it identifies mandatory emergent requirements for 
component repair at the piece-parts level that were not 
identified during the advance planning phase by either the 
PERAs or the Shipyard P&E Division (Lee, 1994). 
E.   MATERIAL PROCUREMENT 
Upon completion of the material identification and 
requirements determination, Shipyard Planners and Estimators 
compile Job Material Lists (JML) and forward them to the 
shipyard's Logistic Support Center (LSC). The LSC was 
established in Code 500 under the control of the Supply 
Officer to centrally manage advance planning and ordering. 
The LSC is designated as the shipyard's data base manager 
for the JML system. Its functions include obtaining and 
maintaining current material planning data as well as 
providing complete and accurate data for sourcing, 
requisitioning, and procurement of material. The LSC is 
composed of both supply and technical personnel. The entire 
requisition process from requisitioning to receipt will be 
examined in detail in Chapter III. 
In 1985, the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand 
conducted a comprehensive investigation into the management of 
Navy shipyards. As discussed in one of their findings, 
required delivery dates (RDD) for materials are unrealistic 
with respect to actual need dates and the efficient use of 
17 
production labor (Coopers & Lybrand, 1985). Specifically, the 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) policy established by 
NAVSEA Instruction 4700.8A, Change Transmittal 1, dated 24 
January 1983, stated that all work specifications and 
materials should be available at the start of an availability. 
This inefficiency led to the use of premium pay for SPCC and 
DLA to ensure delivery of materials that may not be needed for 
several weeks or months. 
As a result of the Coopers and Lybrand Study, NAVSEA 
issued the Naval Sea Systems Command Shipyard Material 
Policies Manual in February 1988. This manual stated that the 
Required Delivery Date for material should be based on the 
start of Key Operations/Tasks rather than the start of the 
availability. Additionally, to ensure proper material 
management, upon the completion of a key operation all 
outstanding orders for material not yet received will be 
reviewed for cancellation. 
F.  PLANNED REQUIREMENTS 
Planned maintenance requirements should be requisitioned 
from the supply system utilizing a 500/600 series Project Code 
and a Non-recurring Demand Code "P". The Project Code enables 
SPCC and DLA to match requisitions to PPRs and SPRs while the 
non-recurring demand code prevents stock from being procured 
twice, once for the forecast and once for the requisition. 
Additionally, one of the following advice codes 5E/5R/5Y/5D/57 
should be entered on the document and the 14-digit 
requisition number should match the number initially entered 
for the PPR and SPR.  (Hornock, 1994) 
A General Accounting Office investigation into planned 
program requirements in 1993 found weaknesses in SPCC's 
internal monitoring and control of PPRs. Specifically, SPCC's 
files contained duplicate and unauthorized planned program 
18 
requirements, as well as inappropriate requirements for which 
SPCC had not budgeted. Finally, SPCC's written guidance for 
validating planned requirements were deemed inadequate. GAO's 
concern was that duplicate and unauthorized requirements could 
result in the possible procurement of unneeded materials. 
(GAO/NSIAD-93-151) 
The two types of PPRs which affect the industrial 
customer are those for scheduled SHIPALTS (Ship Alterations) 
and Planned Maintenance. SPCC Code 033 does a manual match of 
SHIPALT PPRs with a resultant 93% match rate between the 
requisition and the PPR. The manual methodology matches UIC 
(Unit Identification Code), NSN and time frame of the 
availability within a six-month window either side of the 
start date.  (Weir, 1994) 
For Planned Maintenance PPRs there is no data which shows 
the rate that PPRs match incoming industrial requisitions. 
The "best guess" match rate is between 40% and 80%. These 
figures are usually after-the-fact using manual review of the 
records to try and make the requisitions match. It is 
impossible to attempt a total manual match because the number 
of PPRs for this type of work typically is much too large. 
(Weir, 1994) 
Currently, the automated part of the Uniform Inventory 
Control Program (UICP) is unable to make the match with all of 
the parameters listed in the first paragraph of this section. 
The main reasons for this are that the Unit Identification 
Code (UIC) often doesn't match the input UIC for the PPR and 
the wrong project code, advice code and/or demand code are 
used or they may be missing from the requisitions. Attempts 
are being made at SPCC to manually try to match the 
requisitions in the Transaction History File (THF) with one or 
more of the parameters. If this can be done the "hit" is 
counted as a filled PPR.  This matching process will also 
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include making a comparison of PPRs to completed requisitions 
in the previous six months which contain a Shipyard, SIMA or 
SUPSHIPS Document Identification and any ship of the Class UIC 
in the supplementary address.  (Hornock, 1994) 
DLA is experiencing the same problems as SPCC in 
attempting to match the requisition to a SPR using the same 
criteria as indicated above. A recent DOD Inspector General 
Audit discovered that all DOD activities submitted Special 
Program Requirements (SPRs) to DLA that were inappropriate or 
were for excessive and unsubstantiated quantities. In 
addition, DOD activities subsequently submitted requisitions 
that could not be readily related to the SPR's for which the 
supply support had been planned. For example, when a shipyard 
orders DLA material from the Fleet and Industrial Supply 
Center (FISC), there are no internal controls to ensure that 
the proper requisition format for an SPR is used. Since this 
requisition does not indicate to the supply system that it is 
an SPR, the records continue to show the SPR as unfilled, when 
in fact it actually is.  (DOD IG Audit, 90-087) 
After DLA Headquarters staff completed a comprehensive 
review of the SPR program, they established a communications 
network called Industrial Forecasting Support Group (IFSG). 
The purpose of IFSG is to achieve a consistent level of 
support from DLA through extensive coordination efforts with 
the Services' major industrial maintenance activities. The 
IFSG will provide a single face to the customer and would be 
responsible for closely coordinating filling the SPR 
requirements of the requesting industrial activities with 
greater accuracy and confidence.  (St. John, 1994) 
Concurrently, DLA is developing a SPR Automated 
Information System to provide better statistical information 
regarding SPR usage by service and activity. The program will 
use 15 possible match combinations in order to match SPR 
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documents to requisitions in an effort to determine validity 
of service forecasts. SPR matching data will be used to 
monitor the SPR program as well as provide feedback to 
industrial activities to assist them in improving their 
forecasts.  (St. John, 1994) 
G.  CASE STUDIES 
In 1993 the NAVSEA/NAVSUP Joint Process Action Team 
(JPAT) conducted several case studies to examine in detail the 
Industrial Material Forecasting for three different ship class 
hulls. The results of two of those case studies, which 
involved the USS CROMMELIN (FFG-37) and USS CARL VINSON (CVN- 
70), show the difficulties with the current forecasting 
process and attempts to match corresponding requisitions to 
the preplanned requirements. The CROMMELIN case focuses on 
SPCC-managed parts while the CARL VINSON case looks at DLA- 
managed material. The accuracy of the data used by the 
NAVSEA/NAVSUP Team was directly related to the discipline 
applied by the shipyard to assign appropriate project codes on 
their maintenance requisitions. 
1. USS CROMMELIN Case 
The USS CROMMELIN case study made comparisons between the 
PERA forecast for the availability scheduled from March 1992 
to September 1992 with SPCC's Transaction History File. The 
requisitions examined covered the period January 1991 to 
August 1992 with a Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard UIC (00311) 
and/or CROMMELIN's supplementary address UIC or the three- 
digit Project Code beginning with 54_. 
The following NSN populations were determined for this 
specific availability by the JPAT from the maintenance 
forecast: 
21 
63 NSNs were SPCC items supported as PPRs; 
147 NSNs were SPCC items supported as NSOs; and 
1 NSN was a SPCC item mistakenly identified as both 
Mandatory and Contingent by PERA. 
A comparison of the mandatory items (PPRs) in the 
Maintenance Forecast and SPCC's Transaction History File (THF) 
data showed 80 NSNs with an UIC and Project Code match for 
this availability.  The following results were obtained: 
(a) 52 NSNs were forecasted by PERA Surface but were 
not reguisitioned by the shipyard; 
(b) 11 NSNs were forecasted by PERA Surface and were 
reguisitioned by the shipyard; and 
(c) 69 NSNs were not forecasted by PERA Surface, and 
were reguisitioned by the shipyard. 
For SPCC-managed items classified as contingency, the 
following information was obtained: 
(a) 142 NSNs were forecasted by PERA Surface and were 
not reguisitioned by the shipyard; 
(b) 75 NSNs were not forecasted by PERA Surface, but 
were reguisitioned by the Shipyard; and 
(c) 5 NSNs were forecasted by PERA Surface and were 
reguisitioned by the shipyard. 
2. USS CARL VINSON Case 
This case, which looked at DLA material only, compared 
items in the PERA CV Maintenance Forecast for the overhaul 
scheduled from September 1990 to September 1992 with the job 
material listing (JML) and reguisitions submitted by NSY Puget 
Sound to DLA.  This analysis revealed the following figures: 
Total Non-Nuclear NIINs:     1,390  Forecasted; 
11,807  Total reguirements. 
From a comparison of the DLA COG items classified as 
mandatory (SPRs) with the actual reguisitions,  the JPAT 
obtained the following information: 
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(a) 643 NSNs were forecasted by PERA CV and were not 
identified in the shipyard's JML nor later 
requisitioned; 
(b) 708 NSNs were forecasted by PERA CV, were 
identified in the shipyard's JML and were 
requisitioned; 
(c) 9,769 NSNs were not forecasted, but were identified 
in the shipyard's JML and were available from the 
supply system(DLA); and 
(d) 1,291 NSNs were not forecasted, were identified in 
the shipyard's JML and were not available from 
the supply system (DLA). 
(e) 39 NSNs which were forecasted by PERA CV. 
However, they were acquired via local procurement. 
H.   NAVSEA SHIPYARD MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE 
This section examines a program initiated by Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA) to improve business practices and 
operations in Naval Shipyards. This examination commences 
with an identification of the management problems experienced 
at the shipyards as outlined in the Coopers and Lybrand study. 
1.  The Coopers and Lybrand Study 
The Navy currently maintains eight shipyards to overhaul, 
repair, modify and outfit surface ships and submarines. As a 
result of the BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) process, 
this number is shrinking to five shipyards located at 
Portsmouth NH, Norfolk, Puget Sound, Long Beach and Pearl 
Harbor. It is anticipated that as a result of BRAC 95, the 
Navy may lose another shipyard. 
The Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) was created in 1949 to 
administer finances for Navy-owned industrial and commercial 
activities. Today, the NIF operated under the Defense 
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) is a $15 billion-a-year 
operation with the majority of funding going to Navy 
shipyards, aviation depots, ordinance stations and public 
works centers.   In the mid-1980's, the four groups of 
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activities had several major problems. Their facilities and 
equipment were aging and becoming obsolete. Additionally, 
costs were escalating rapidly and productivity was falling. 
The net effect of these problems caused shipyard products and 
services to cost more than private sector sources and there 
were large backlogs. (Naval Industrial Improvement Program 
Initiatives, 1989) 
These problems motivated the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (S&L) to commission the accounting firm 
of Coopers and Lybrand to assess the Navy Industrial Fund and 
Naval Industrial Fund Activities in 1985 and to make 
suggestions for improvement. Major issues addressed were: 
Headquarters Relationship with the shipyards, Management 
Control Systems and Techniques, Business Management Training 
and Experience, and Material Management. 
The Coopers and Lybrand study defined Material Management 
to include those functions which cover the identification, 
procurement, storage, inventory control and distribution of 
repair and alteration parts and equipment required to support 
production. It was found that shipyards had excess inventory, 
while key parts were not available and procurement lead time 
was too long. All of these factors drove costs up and delayed 
work. 
The observations from the Coopers and Lybrand study 
covered the following five major categories: 
(1) Shipyard Planning and Control. Shipyards do not 
have an effective planning base from which to establish 
accurate materials requirements for ship availabilities or to 
measure actual performance in material ordering versus 
material usage. This fact was confirmed in Section G by the 
results of the NAVSEA/NAVSUP JPAT case studies. 
(2) Materials Management Information Systems. Current 
systems are not designed to effectively support materials 
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planning or procurement. The material management (MM) 
subsystem of the Shipyard Management Information System 
(SYMIS) is capable of tracking material, but does not support 
materials planning or procurement. 
(3) Materials Planning. Materials planning is currently 
based on specific production plans or schedules (Geuard, 
1994). However, the procedure precludes planning direct 
material reguirements effectively for future overhauls because 
complete and accurate data on usage are not collected, and 
information about usage on prior overhauls is not analyzed to 
determine future materials reguirements. 
(4) Procurement. Systems do not exist for joint 
procurement between shipyards. There is no system to combine 
reguirements for different shipyards on commonly-purchased 
items to reduce costs on a routine basis. Additionally, there 
is no automated system to provide access to current data on 
procurement history and vendor performance. 
(5) Inventory Management and Control. Materials are 
ordered for specific job order/key operations end use, but 
considerable material ordered and received is never issued for 
use. Materials issued for work-in-process are not tracked or 
controlled after issue. Materials issued against a given job 
may be applied to that end use or may be used in another 
application or may be used to replenish stock used earlier 
from a "gold pile". 
2. Advanced Industrial Management (AIM) Program 
As a result of the specific problems identified in the 
Coopers and Lyrand Study and the premises of the National 
Performance Review (reinventing government), there is pressure 
for use of more business-like practices at all levels of 
government. This reguires a comprehensive business process 
reengineering effort as the means to achieve the solution 
(Bankes, 1994). 
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The shipyard management initiative taken by NAVSEA is to 
implement the Advanced Industrial Management (AIM) Program. 
AIM is a redesign of the Naval Shipyard core business 
processes for planning and managing production work for ship 
repair and modernization. The AIM/BPR (Business Process 
Reengineering) approach depends on clearly defining the 
guiding principles of the business and designing new, more 
efficient alternative processes.  (Bankes, 1993) 
The result of the reengineering effort is not supposed to 
be the development of an entirely new computer hardware and 
software system. Rather, AIM is the creation of a system to 
interface with existing shipyard systems such as Material 
Management (MM) in order to make them more efficient by 
guickly providing more information to more users. 
The AIM Business Model consists of the Process Model, 
Object Model and AIM Products. The Process Model identifies 
the ten high level processes critical to shipyard performance: 
- Strategic Planning: Develops strategic requirements for 
facilities, workforce, and skills, plus standard planning 
tools and operational guidance. 
- Contract Administration and Financial Control: Creates 
the project budget, administers the contract and funds, 
reports project and financial status to the customer. 
- Project Planning and Management; Defines objectives, key 
events, milestones, test boundaries, high-level resource 
strategies, and project planning timetable elements. 
- Job Planning: Contains the necessary technical and 
procedural information for the mechanic to perform the work 
without the need to request additional information after the 
work begins. 
- Technical Information Management: Captures planning 
documents from all shipyards to increase reuse of data, and 
provides access to accurate technical information. 
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_ Resource Control; Develops and maintains plans to 
properly control and allocate shipyard resources among all 
shipyard projects. Resources include: labor (various trade 
skills), materials, tools, equipment, and facilities. 
- Project Scheduling and Sequencing; Provide the level of 
detail necessary for effective project management in support 
of the Project Execution Strategy. 
- Work Packaging and Control; Controls the release of work 
and achieves economies through packaging tasks for efficient 
work execution. 
- Execution Control; Controls and coordinates the 
execution of work on a daily basis. Sets task priorities and 
manning, reports task status, manhour expenditures, resource 
usage and any problems encountered in the work. 
- Performance Measurement Control; Collects, analyzes, and 
reports task level performance data. 
The AIM Object Model focuses on the types of data needed 
in the Business Model (Activity, Financial Information, 
Network, Resource, Schedule, Strategic Information, Technical 
Information and Work Definition). The AIM Products consist of 
those created, maintained or utilized within the AIM Process 
Model which significantly contribute to the planning and 
management of resources and work required to accomplish a 
project (AIM GPD, 1992). The following items are the major 
AIM products: 
- Shipyard Strategic Plan and Shipyard Operations Plan 
- Work Definition Document 
- Project Management Plan 
- Shipyard Resource Plan and Project Resource Plan 
- Task, Task Group, and Task Sheet 
- Project Network/Schedule 
- Project Manpower Pool 
- Work Kits (materials/special tools to do specific jobs) 
- Work/Test Control Documents 
- Task Package 
- Performance and Variance Reports 
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Refinement of the AIM Business Model was conducted at a 
neutral site, the Naval Shipyard Development and Integration 
Test Site located at Norfolk NSY. This was established 
primarily for the development, integration, test and validation 
of the Model before it was actually implemented at the 
shipyards. This setting minimized the variation caused by 
different business practices followed at the shipyards. 
(Bankes, 1993) 
In order to . prevent the shipyards from becoming 
overwhelmed, AIM is being implemented in two primary steps, 
Baseline AIM (BAIM) and Full AIM (FAIM). Baseline AIM has five 
of the ten core business model processes and is currently in 
various stages of implementation at all of the shipyards not 
scheduled for closure. Full AIM is expected to be in place 
during FY95.  (Bankes, 1994) 
a. Materials Requirements (MR) Subsystem 
The Material Reguirements Subsystem which is located 
in the Resource Control module of the AIM Program creates all 
varieties of Job Material Lists (JMLs), which are used to 
reguisition material, tools, parts, and services. Though not 
fully implemented in the AIM system, MR will interface with the 
shipyard's MM system in order to standardize material ordering. 
Several main goals of MR include: provide one system to order 
ship and non-ship (admin) reguirements; batch routing and 
processing of requirements to remove paperwork; purchase 
expediting using Electronic Data Interface (EDI) with vendors; 
provide query capabilities for local and corporate JMLs; 
provide query capabilities for local and corporate Actual 
Material Usage files; reduce time required for material 
inspection by having data readily accessible on computer screen 
versus the current method of "searching" for inspection 
paperwork.  (Fargo, 1994) 
28 
The MR software package is undergoing development at 
the present time. Initial testing is expected to begin at 
Puget Sound NSY in January 1995. Upon successful completion of 
these tests, MR will be exported to all shipyards commencing 
March 1995. 
b.  MM/AIM Relationship 
The material ordering process begins with the Planner 
using the automated AIM (MR) system to order material. Next, 
the requirement is sent to the Supply Department at the 
shipyard via the MM system. That department sends the 
requisition for standard stock material to the supply system or 
a contract is sent to a vendor. In both of these cases the MM 
system tracks the status of the material through 
receipt/storage at the shipyard. 
When AIM has determined the schedule of work, a kit 
is prepared for the mechanics/technicians. This kit includes 
the material, tools, task sheet as well as other required 
resources. AIM tracks the job until completion at which time 
the workers return the excess RFI (Ready For Issue) material to 
Supply where the MM System takes over. The workers also 
provide Actual Material Usage information which is tracked by 
AIM (MR) for future planning. 
Overall, the ultimate success of AIM will be measured 
in terms of productivity increases, reduced ship overhaul cycle 
times and dollar savings to the Navy. Additionally, by having 
planning data from previous jobs easily accessible in a 
corporate repository, PERAs can more accurately determine the 
POU factors which impact material forecasts. 
I. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to explain the entire 
process of forecasting material requirements for ships 
undergoing  maintenance  availabilities.    It  showed  the 
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complexities of the process as well as the disparities between 
forecasts given to SPCC and DLA with the requisitions submitted 
to either supply system. The important point to remember is 
that the items ordered after the start of the availability 
impact the system and its ability to respond to the 
requisitioner by the Required Delivery Date (RDD), especially 
if the items are not in stock. The final section described the 
NAVSEA AIM program initiative designed to overcome the 
deficiencies described throughout this chapter. Chapter III 
examines the entire requisition pipeline from requirement 
submission through material receipt. 
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III.  MATERIAL REQUISITION PROCESS 
Material or services are obtained by either submitting a 
requisition to the supply system which consists of the Navy, 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and General Services 
Administration (GSA) or submission of a purchase requisition 
to a buying activity for procurement from a commercial source. 
This chapter examines the procedures and the times for each of 
the following segments of the requisition pipeline: Naval 
Shipyard submission to Point of Entry (POE), Passing action 
and Inventory Control Point (ICP) determination, Storage site 
processing and Packaging, and Transportation and Receipt 
processing. 
A.  NAVAL SHIPYARD REQUISITION SUBMISSION PROCESS 
This section examines the procedures used by Norfolk 
Naval Shipyard (NNSY) to order material for scheduled 
maintenance. These procedures are similar to those used at 
the other shipyards. In all cases, the sources of input for 
requisitions are the Topside Planners who do the advance 
ordering of material prior to the start of the Availability 
and the Shop Planners who order material after the start of 
the job. 
All of the shipyards currently use an ADP system to 
automate the preparation of Job Material Lists (JMLs); the 
first step in ordering material. Norfolk Naval Shipyard uses 
a system called APS (Automated Planning System) while the 
other shipyards use a system called AMPS (Automated Material 
Procurement System). Both APS and AMPS are integral parts of 
the AIM (Advanced Industrial Management) Program which was 
discussed in Chapter II. Even though JMLs are becoming more 
automated, handwritten JMLs are still prepared for emergent, 
work stoppage requirements. During conversations with a 
Planning Supervisor at NNSY, he indicated that approximately 
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5% of the JMLs are handwritten and walked through the 
requisition submission process. 
In preparing JMLs the key data elements besides the stock 
number and quantity are the priority and required delivery 
date (RDD). The priority assigned is based on an Urgency of 
Need Designator (UND) and the Force/Activity Designator (FAD). 
The UND is either an "A", "B" or "C", with "A" associated with 
the highest degree of urgency. A FAD is a Roman numeral (I 
through V) assigned by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, or a DOD component to indicate the mission 
essentiality of an organization to meet national objectives 
(DOD 4140.60). All CONUS industrial and intermediate 
maintenance and repair activities are assigned FAD III with 
the following assigned priorities based on the UND: 03, 06, 
13. Guidelines in OPNAV Instruction 4614.IF indicate that 
shipyards can only assign Issue Priority Group (IPG) 1, 
priorities 01 - 08, on 50% of their requisitions per month. 
1.  Priority and RDD Determination 
Planning Supervisors interviewed at several shipyards 
offered similar means of assigning priority and RDD. If the 
availability is to begin greater than six months from today, 
priority 13 is used with an RDD that coincides with the start 
of the availability. At the 60-day point, the priority is 
upgraded to 06 with RDD assigned to the start of the key 
operation. At 35 days before the arrival of the ship and 
during the entire availability, priority 03 is used. Again, 
the RDD is based on the start of the key operation. However, 
several of the supervisors indicated that once the ship is in 
the yard, the "rule of thumb" which they follow is to have the 
RDD equal to the Julian Date (JD) of the requisition plus 3 
days. For all material requirements, the requisition numbers 
are assigned locally by the Planners or Shops from a pre- 
assigned set of numbers. 
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Once all of the data elements are entered, the Planning 
and Estimating Supervisor provides a quality check on the JML 
by verifying priority, RDD, project code and any advice codes. 
Despite the efforts of Supply Departments at the shipyards to 
train personnel on JML preparation, in particular for priority 
and RDD, some requisitions with "unrealistic" RDDs are passed 
to the supply system. 
Other factors which impact priority assignment as well as 
RDD are short-fuzed ship assignments as well as last minute 
funding from the TYCOM for jobs that were previously deleted 
from the work package. These cause Planners to use higher 
priorities and short RDDs for emergent work. (Bergamini, 1994) 
2. Material Management System 
From this point the requirement is released to the 
shipyard Material Management (MM) system. The MM will screen 
assets at the shipyard and at other yards. If material is not 
available, the JML is sent to the Supply Department where the 
data elements are again verified and the requisition is 
committed. The batch-processed requisitions are submitted by 
the Supply Department to the supply system via MILSTRIP using 
document identifier "AOA" in the evening after the close of 
business. (NNSY P4400-3) 
The time standards for submission of requisitions are 
based on the UMMIPS time standards (DOD 4140.1-R). Table 3 
gives a breakdown of those standards for all pipeline segments 
and will be used as a reference throughout this chapter. The 
time standards are service level targets which should be met 
or improved upon whenever physically and economically 
feasible. 
33 
Pipeline    Pri 01 - 08        Pri 01 - 08 Pri 01 - 15 
(Pri 01-15 for 444) 
RDD = 999,      RDD = 444,555,777       Blank RDD 
N ,E  
Requisition        I 1 2 
Submission 
Passing Action      .5 1 1 
ICP Availability    11 l1 
Determination 
Depot Storage Site   11 5 
Processing/Packaging 
Transportation Hold  14 10 
CONUS Intransit 
Receipt Takeup      .5 1 3 
by Requisitioner 
Total Order-Ship     5 9 22 
Time 
Table 3.  UMMIPS Time Standards in Calendar Days. 
(From DOD 4140.1-R) 
The Required Delivery Dates shown are defined as follows: 
999  Indicates expedited handling for NMCS (Non-Mission 
Capable Supply) overseas customers or CONUS 
Customers deploying overseas within 30 days. 
N   Indicates expedited handling due to NMCS 
Requirement CONUS customer. 
E   Indicates expedited handling due to anticipated 
NMCS requirement of a CONUS customer. 
555  Indicates exception to mass requisition 
cancellation2, expedited handling required. 
xFor manually submitted requisitions or requisitions 
requiring manual review use 1 day for Pri 01-08 and 3 days for 
Pri 09-15. 
2Mass cancellations are caused by events such as base 
closures, project terminations, ship and unit deactivations or 
termination of vessel outfitting. 
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777  Indicates expedited handling for other than the 
above reasons. 
444 Used by customers collocated with the supply depot 
or by customers who have obtained collocated 
status through local negotiations and the fastest 
possible service of the supply and transportation 
system is not desired. 
Specific date indicates handling to meet that date 
of delivery. It is considered separate from Table 
3. 
Blank RDD indicates routine handling. 
Utilizing MILSTEP data provided by the Operations 
Research Division (Code 046) located at SPCC, Table 4 lists 
the statistics on the submission times (in days) for the time 
period from January 1994 to June 1994. The standard deviation 
column shows that a considerable amount of variability is 
evident in the process. 
CONSIGNEE IPG3 NUMBER OF AVG STANDARD MEDIAN 
REQNS DAYS DEVIATION VALUE 
Naval ALL 38,756 4.0 7.9 1.7 
Shipyards IPG-1 19,200 3.5 8.5 1.1 
IPG-2 10,111 4.5 7.7 2.1 
Norfolk ALL 17,568 3.8 7.2 1.4 
NSY IPG-1 6,598 2.4 7.5 .6 
IPG-2 6,584 3.4 6.0 1.4 
Table 4.  Shipyard Submission Times, Days. 
The data reveals that it takes the Naval Shipyards 4.0 
days on average to submit their requisitions to the supply 
3IPG (Issue Priority Group); All = priorities 01-15 
IPG-1 = priorities 01-03 
IPG-2 = priorities 04-08. 
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system. The time period begins with the Julian Date of the 
requisition and terminates when it is received at the Point of 
Entry (POE), normally the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 
(FISC) which serves the shipyard's geographical location. In 
the case of NNSY the nearest FISC is located at Norfolk and it 
takes 3.8 days on average to submit all requisitions to that 
FISC. 
Table 5 shows the percentage of requisitions submitted 
within UMMIPS standards. For example, 59.4% of all shipyard 
IPG-1 requisitions are submitted on-time. Though this 
percentage may seem high, it compares favorably with the 
median value in Table 4. Despite the overall average of 3.5 
days to submit IPG-1 requisitions, the median value by 
definition indicates that at least 50% of the requisitions 
were submitted in 1.1 days or less. 
CONSIGNEE IPG=ALL        IPG=1 IPG=2 
Naval Shipyards       52.6%        59.4%        40.4% 
Norfolk NSY 56.8%        70.9%        52.7% 
Table 5. Percentage of Requisitions within UMMIPS Standards. 
In discussions with Supply Department personnel at 
several shipyards it was discovered that delays occur when 
JMLs are prepared and forwarded to Supply. For automated JMLs 
they are downloaded from the MM system to magnetic tape in the 
afternoon, normally by 2:00 p.m. Then they are batch- 
processed and transmitted to the supply system in the evening. 
If the requisition is generated by the Planners after 2:00 
p.m. then the requisition is held and it is transmitted the 
evening of the next day. This situation will add an 
additional day to the measurement of the submission time. 
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In further discussions with shipyard Supply Department 
personnel, delays occur with the preparation of manual JMLs, 
not only for repair material, but also for routine 
administrative requirements. In addition, manual JMLs are 
often routed to the Supply Department via the shipyard Guard 
Mail. Even some Priority 03 requisitions have been passed via 
this method. Additional delays can also occur when manual 
JMLs are awaitinq supervisor review. In any case, the 4-day 
averaqe time to submit requisitions impairs the ability of the 
external supply system to respond by the RDD. This is 
particularly true when Planners are using their "Rule of 
Thumb" (Julian Date plus three days) for determining the RDD 
when a ship is in the shipyard. 
3.  Urgent Requirements 
The procedures are slightly different for manual JMLs for 
urgently required repair parts. Once the JML is hand carried 
to Supply, a stock check is conducted at the local FISC. If 
material is available, then a "Bearer Pickup" is processed. 
If the material is available at the Inventory Control Point 
(ICP), then the MILSTRIP is sent in by either phone or FAX 
with a document identifier AOE. In this case the time 
standards are greatly reduced through manual intervention in 
contrast to automated processes. 
On the other hand, if the urgently needed repair part is 
not carried in the supply system and there are no excess items 
at the shipyard, then the requirement is forwarded to local 
procurement. For SPCC-managed items which are NIS (Not in 
Stock), the shipyard should pass the requisition to SPCC and 
have their procurement specialists buy the item (SPCCINST 
4235.150). More often then not, the shipyard will normally go 
out and purchase the part locally. The Planners and 
Supervisors at the shipyards the author spoke with indicated 
that this is the preferred method for them to do business. By 
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using local purchasing, the shipyard can maintain direct 
"control" over the procurement process from award to delivery 
to ensure task deadlines are met. 
B.  PASSING ACTION AND ICP DETERMINATION 
In this section an examination is conducted of the 
segment known as Referral Processing time which is the period 
from the date the reguisition is referred from the POE until 
the time it is received at the ISP (Issue Stock Point). This 
involves two parts, time from POE to the ICP and time from the 
ICP to the ISP. Since the MILSTEP reporting system is not 
able to determine the exact time a reguisition arrives at the 
ICP from the POE, both of these UMMIPS segments have been 
combined into one (Armstrong, 1994). 
In the automated environment when a demand is placed on 
the supply system at a stock point it is usually filled from 
material available there. The stock point issues the material 
and forwards a report of the transaction to the ICP via the 
process called Transaction Item Reporting (TIR). When the ICP 
receives the TIR, its records are adjusted to show the 
decrease in on-hand stock. If the stock point cannot satisfy 
the customer's reguests because it is NIS or Not Carried (NC) 
or possibly it cannot identify the item, or the item is 
subject to ICP control, then it is forwarded to the ICP. 
Stock points do not attempt extensive technical 
identification, substitution, or local purchase unless they 
have been specifically directed to do so by the ICP. (Lyons, 
1994) 
The UICP process of receiving, checking, accumulating, 
and satisfying a customer's reguest is termed Reguisition 
Processing. The Reguisition Processing operation used by SPCC 
has been automated as much as possible to minimize the human 
intervention reguired. However, in situations that only human 
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judgement can resolve, the data processing system, which is 
based on "management by exception", will refer the document to 
the appropriate Inventory Manager (IM) for action (UICP Users 
Manual, 1992). Some of the items which would cause a manual 
intervention would include, but are not limited to, the SMIC 
Code or "Dripper Code" placed on an item by the IM. A Dripper 
Code, which restricts material from being automatically 
issued, is normally acted upon the next business day by the 
IM. However this can be delayed several days if the 
reguisition is received on a Friday and not acted upon until 
Monday. Overall, any actions which impede the processing of 
a document increase the time to process the requisition. The 
time standard as indicated in Table 3 is one day and the 
result of manual intervention can add another day or two to 
the requisition pipeline.  (Lyons, 1994) 
Unlike the Levels Setting, Demand and Lead time Averaging 
Operations, Requisition Processing is concerned primarily with 
policy rather than theory. The policy for Requisition 
Processing is established by the Naval Supply Systems Command 
and carried out by the ICP's Stock Control Divisions (Lyons, 
1994). DLA provides similar guidance for its ICPs. 
1. Automated Requisition Processing at SPCC 
The foundation of the Requisition Processing (B01) 
operation is a series of real-time computer programs (on-line, 
not batch processed) designed to process requisitions through 
the validation and fill procedures, to update files, and to 
generate action and status outputs. The programs reject 
invalid requisitions; generate Stock Status Reports (SSRs) for 
those requisitions that cannot be processed automatically; 
process cancellations, follow-ups and backorder release 
candidates; and handle updating and posting actions (UICP 
Users Manual, 1992).  In discussions with inventory managers 
39 
at several DLA ICPs, similar operations are run on their 
systems. 
2.  System Material Availability 
The total referral processing time is directly related to 
the System Material Availability (SMA). This customer service 
measure of effectiveness for the wholesale level is defined as 
the percent of requisitions which are satisfied on the first 
pass against system assets.   It is computed as follows: 
SMA(%) = 100 X [l.O - MOE/Demand] 
where, 
MOE = Material Obligations Established = Backorders + DVDs; 
DVD = Direct Vendor Deliveries. 
The current Navy goal for wholesale SMA is 85 percent (NAVSUP 
P-553).  As an example, Figure 2 provides data from the UICP 
M67 SMA Report for all 7-COG items (Depot Level Repairables) 
managed by SPCC for the period OCT 1993 - JUL 1994: 
85.8 
Figure 2. Observed SMA values for 7-COG items managed by SPCC. 
Using SMA as a measure, if stocked material is available 
85% of the time for issue when a requisition is submitted, 
then the supply system should be able to fill this percentage 
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of requisitions on or before the RDD. This assumption is 
based on the premise that the requisitions are processed 
within UMMIPS standards for each segment of the pipeline as 
shown in Table 3, and the requisitioner reasonably assigned a 
RDD taking into consideration the time standards as well. 
Based upon MILSTEP data provided for the period from 
January 1994 to June 1994, Table 6 shows the statistics on the 
number of days to process a requisition from the POE to the 
ISP. 










































Table 6 Referral Processing Time, Days 
As can be seen by the data for Norfolk NSY, it takes less 
than 1/2 day on average to refer an industrial requisition 
from the POE to the Issuing Stock Point. The high variability 
is a result of those requisitions which require manual 
intervention as discussed above, as well with requisitions in 
backorder status (BB) or under technical review (BD). This 
includes the 15% of requisitions not filled as defined by the 
SMA. The low median value indicates that most of the 
requisitions were filled immediately from on hand inventories 
at the POE stock point. 
In the next section, stock point processing will be 
discussed, focusing on procedures and time standards in order 
to ship material in a timely manner. 
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C.  STOCK POINT PROCESSING 
This segment commences when the requisition is received 
at the Issuing Stock Point (ISP) and terminates on the day 
when the material has been packaged and shipped. 
As a result of Defense Management Review Decision 902, 
management of service distribution depots (warehouses) and 
transportation activities were transferred to DLA in March 
1992. The processing procedures discussed in this section 
were obtained through conversations with supervisors at the 
Defense Depots at Tracy and San Diego, California. These 
Depots' warehouse operations are different. San Diego has the 
responsibility of handling Navy-owned material while Tracy 
handles all DLA-owned inventory for all DOD activities. 
Once a requisition is passed from the ICP to the 
distribution depot at Tracy as a MRO (Material Release Order), 
the DLA Warehousing and Shipping Procedures (DWASP) system 
takes over processing at this point. This facility is 
manpower intensive with stock selected using manual methods. 
At formerly Navy operated stock points such as San Diego, 
when the MRO is received from either the DLA ICP or SPCC, the 
storage and retrieval function is performed by NISTARS (Naval 
Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval System). This 
system was designed to interface with FISC's Uniform Automated 
Data Processing System for stock points (UADPS-U2). 
DLA operates an automated warehouse at Sharpe California 
similar to the one at San Diego. This warehouse is controlled 
with the Defense Distribution System (DDS) and features high- 
rise storage racks with manriders. Additionally, features 
include receiving assist devices including bar code readers 
and on-line terminals at receiving/inspection stations, 
storage and shipping stations with bar code readers, and an 
automated guided vehicle system. At all locations, incoming 
requisitions are batch-processed at night with picking tickets 
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dropped for material after midnight. At 0530, the morning 
shift picks up the tickets and sorts them for workers to start 
picking material by 0600 with the goal of having everything 
ready for shipment by noon. Daily work is not stopped until 
material for all customers has been selected and packaged with 
documentation attached. This process is 99% effective with 
the balance attributed to inventory problems or computer 
downtime.  (Geralis, 1994) 
In order to standardize the operating systems at all of 
the DLA warehouses, a system known as DSS (Distribution 
Support System) is scheduled to replace systems currently in 
use. This will initially commence with Tracy in January 1995 
and Sharpe in February 1995. A few of the functions which DSS 
will monitor include inventory transactions and transportation 
scheduling.  (Carter, 1994) 
After the material has been picked from stock it is 
packaged and passed to the Transportation Department for 
shipment processing. At all of the DLA sites, a computerized 
scheduling system will determine if air or surface modes of 
transportation will be utilized. At Tracy a sub-routine of 
DWASP performs this function and at San Diego NAVADS (Naval 
Automated Documentation System) is used. (Carter, 1994) 
At the Transportation Department, the floor is set up by 
geographical regions and the mode of transportation is 
determined by several factors as listed below (DDRW SOP 94- 
001) : 
1. CASREP/NMCS/PMCS requirements 
2. Priority 
3. Required Delivery Date 
4. Project Code 
5. Destination 
6. Size and Weight 
7. Customer requests or requirements 
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Though this list is not in prioritized sequence, RDD 
tends to drive the selection of the mode process. However, if 
the RDD has expired when an item arrives at the Transportation 
Department, it will only be expedited if the requisition has 
a high priority and urgent Project Code or the customer has 
specifically requested that it be expedited. Similarly, if 
the requisition has no specified RDD, a routine ticket will be 
generated to ship the material.  (Wagner, 1994) 
Once date and mode of shipment are determined, a document 
with a DIC of "AS1" is transmitted to let the requisitioner 
know when the material was shipped and mode of shipment. The 
MILSTEP data in Table 7 shows the statistics on the time taken 
to complete this segment of the pipeline. 
CONSIGNEE IPG NUMBER OF AV6 STANDARD MEDIAN 
REQNS DATS DEVIATION VALUE 
Naval ALL 39,006 3.2 6.4 1.1 
Shipyards 1 19,393 1.0 3.2 .5 
2 10,145 2.1 3.5 1.2 
NSY ALL 17,593 4.1 6.4 1.3 
Norfolk 1 6,611 1.0 3.6 .7 
2 6,589 1.8 2.3 1.2 
Table 7.  Stock Point Processing Time, Days. 
As can be seen, the average processing time for IPG-1 
requisitions at the warehouses meets the UMMIPS standard of 
one day. For IPG-2 requisitions the average times for all 
Naval shipyards and NSY Norfolk, in particular, are 2.1 and 
1.8 days, respectively. Again, as was observed in Tables 4 
and 6, the standard deviation is large and the median values 
are smaller than the mean. The median values indicate that 
the processing time for 50% of the requisitions was less than 
or equal to the median for each IPG. These median values 
compare favorably with the UMMIPS standards shown in Table 3. 
For example, when an RDD is assigned the processing time is 
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one day, however if the requisitioner does not assign an RDD, 
the processing time can be up to 5 days for all IPGs. 
The times for this segment can be slowed when challenges 
are made with DLA's Airlift Challenge Program. The guidance 
for this program is provided in DLA-OT Policy and Procedures 
Memorandum No. 92-02. The goal of this program is to save 
money by diverting to surface mode those shipments which 
qualify. Specifically, CONUS high priority (IPD 01, NMCS, 
ANMCS, 999, 777, 555, JCS Project Codes) and shipments with a 
short RDD will not be challenged or diverted unless the: 
(1) shipment weighs more than 250 pounds; 
(2) shipment dimensions exceed specified measures of 
length or width; 
(3) shipment is hazardous material; or 
(4) authorization has been obtained from the 
requisitioner to divert to surface transportation. 
The next section will examine the transportation and 
receipt segments.  Specifically, this will include procedures 
used to guarantee delivery within UMMIPS standards as well as 
procedures used at the shipyards to receive material. 
D.  TRANSPORTATION AND MATERIAL RECEIPT 
1.  Transportation Segment 
This section will concentrate on the transportation of 
material to CONUS industrial customers. Transportation to 
activities located outside of CONUS (i.e., Hawaii and Alaska) 
involves several more steps in the process such as 
transportation hold delays which add several additional 
processing days. 
As a result of Defense Management Review Decisions 902 
and 915, there were significant changes to transportation 
operations, policies and practices. Under DMRD 902, all 
military service distribution depots were transferred to DLA 
in March 1992.   All local delivery functions at Navy 
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activities were assumed by DLA from Navy FISCs on 1 July 1994. 
One of the systems which DLA inherited and disestablished 
in September 1994 was the Quicktrans Air Delivery system. 
This system previously caused Navy material to be tracked 
within two systems and delayed by an additional day on 
average. For example, when Navy material was being shipped 
out of DD Tracy or the DLA consolidation center at DD Sharpe 
with a mode of shipment designated as "Quicktrans", it would 
have to be transshipped to the Quicktrans facility near Travis 
AFB before shipment to San Diego (Geralis, 1994). 
As a result of DMRD 915, several initiatives have been 
implemented which have reduced transportation costs.  As the 
next subsections will show, with DLA controlling the entire 
process, a more efficient and streamlined system is possible, 
a. Regional Freight Consolidation Centers 
Approximately 80% of DOD shipments are less-than- 
truckload (LTL) which, on average, cost seven times more than 
full truckload shipments.   Regional freight consolidation 
centers at which many small shipments are consolidated into 
larger shipments can dramatically reduce transportation costs. 
DLA has developed a network of consolidation and distribution 
centers under its Enhanced DLA Distribution System (EDDS) 
program.  The Defense Depot at Sharpe is the consolidation 
point for the West Coast. 
Jb. Guaranteed Traffic (GT) Program 
Under this program for both air and surface 
shipments, MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command) awards 
carriers specific traffic routes for a designated period in 
return for reduced rates. For example, for air freight less 
than 100 lbs, small package air service with tenders such as 
UPS or FEDEX are used. 
Carrier performance evaluation is an integral part 
of the DLA GT program.  Criteria for carrier performance are 
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defined in the GT contracts which are monitored by the 
Headquarters of the Military Traffic Management Command 
(MTMC). For both air and surface modes, the following carrier 
service standards are required (DLA, 1994): 
(1) Carrier is subject to warning or removal when 
transit times are met less than 95 percent of the time, or 
as stated in the GT agreement. 
(2) Carrier must perform 100% on-time delivery when 
"expedited service" is requested. 
The following specifications will be used to determine 
how transit times will be measured: 
(1) Transit times are measured in calendar days, 
including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. 
(2) Transit Time will begin when the Government Bill 
of Lading (GBL)/Commercial Bill of Lading is signed. 
(3) Transit time will end on the day the shipment is 
delivered or offered for delivery (i.e., the carrier 
contacts the customer and both agree upon a date and time 
the shipment can be delivered).  When the actual transit 
times end on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the shipment 
must be delivered on the next business day to be considered 
delivered on time. 
c.     Intransit Data Cards 
Another means besides the Guaranteed Traffic GBL to 
document carrier performance and to measure the transportation 
length of the requisition pipeline is to use Intransit Data 
Cards (IDC). These consist of TK1, TK2, TK3, TK4 and TK8 
documents prescribed in MILSTAMP (Military Standard 
Transportation and Movement Procedures) which are generated 
for each GBL. Once the shipment is received by the consignee, 
the Julian Date is written on the card and it is then mailed 
to Defense Automated Addressing Systems Office (DAASO) at DD 
Tracy where MILSTEP data is compiled. The common document 
used for CONUS shipments is TK4.  (DOD Reg 4000.25-3-M) 
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At Defense Depot Tracy, the DWASP system generates 
a TK4 document for each Transportation Control Number (TCN) on 
a GBL. For example, a consolidated shipment of material being 
shipped from Tracy to San Diego may only have one GBL and one 
TCN with one TK4 document generated. (Nicholson, 1994) 
In general, it was difficult to find anyone who knew 
anything at all about IDCs. Material Receiving personnel at 
NNSY had never heard of them and transportation personnel at 
the DD San Diego said they have not used TK4 documents for 
several years. However, information was eventually obtained 
from personnel at DD Tracy. In subsection 2 a discussion will 
describe how the Navy uses the IDC as one of the elements to 
determine the transportation and receipt time data. 
d.     Local Delivery 
All of the transportation procedures discussed apply 
to freight shipments either between regions or Defense Depots. 
Once material is received at the Depot, it must be segregated 
for redistribution locally. Normally this process can ensure 
delivery to the customer by the next day. For the shipyards 
at Puget Sound and Long Beach, the Defense Distribution Depots 
which serve those activities provide local delivery service to 
them.  (Hicks, 1994) 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard is currently conducting a 
"direct delivery" test with DLA. Instead of material being 
shipped from the Depots to the Distribution Depot at Norfolk 
and then redistributed, the delivery trucks are directed to 
the shipyard first and then offloaded. Preliminary results 
are favorable with a savings of an average of two days 
redistribution time as well as the $29.00 per line item 
surcharge for handling into as well as out of the Defense 
Depot Norfolk. (Charboneau, 1994) 
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2. Receiving and Receipt Processing at NNSY 
The following procedures were obtained from Norfolk NSY 
and are similar to those followed at other shipyards. At 
Central Receiving the trucks are off-loaded and material is 
assigned to a temporary holding bay location on the receiving 
floor. Tri-walls or other consolidated packages are separated 
with the location annotated on the receiving papers (DD 1348-1 
or vendor delivery list) and the papers are forwarded to the 
Receipt Processing Unit. 
During receipt processing, the requisition number is 
input into the Material Management (MM) module of the shipyard 
MIS for processing. After verifying the quantity, stock 
number, dollar value and other elements, the transaction is 
processed. A "D6S" is automatically generated at time of 
receipt and submitted to DAASO to provide material receipt 
data. This information is required in accordance with MILSTEP 
in order to determine the length of this requisition pipeline 
segment. Additionally, a material movement document (MMD) is 
generated for each requisition, attached to the original 
papers and returned to the Receiving section. 
Workers in this section attach the MMDs to the material 
and then move the items from the holding section to the 
delivery section. Daily deliveries are scheduled to move 
material to the end-user, interim storage or to Shop Stores 
(retail inventory account). 
In addition to normal receipt processing, all shipyards 
are directed by NAVSEA to report on a quarterly basis all 
Missing in Transit (MIT) material. This is material which was 
shipped from a DLA warehouse but, due to mishandling, was 
inadvertently lost or sent to another activity. The shipyards 
report each occurrence utilizing a Report of Discrepancy (ROD) 
which is submitted to the shipping activity. At Norfolk NSY 
for the period January 1994 to June 1994, 798 RODs were 
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submitted for Navy and DLA managed material. Even though 
missing material is not a focus of this thesis, the fact that 
the system can lose material in transit is significant enough 
to mention as a negative factor impacting the shipyards. 
Table 8 shows the statistics on this segment of the 
process. SPCC generates this MILSTEP report by making a 
three-way match with the Document Number, D6S report and the 
IDC (TK4). The UMMI.PS time standard is 1.5 days and the data 
provided indicates that this segment is performing 
satisfactorily on average. However, the median value for all 
IPGs is 2.0 days which indicates that greater than 50% of the 
reguisitions do not meet the UMMIPS standard. This can be 
attributed to the fact that redistribution of material locally 
can add additional time to this segment of the reguisition 
pipeline. 
CONSIGNEE IPG NUMBER OF AVG STANDARD MEDIAN 
REQNS DAYS DEVIATION VALUE 
Naval ALL 7,189 1.0 5.4 2.0 
Shipyards 1 4,045 .4 6.6 2.0 
2 2,083 1.1 3.6 2.0 
NSY ALL 4,023 1.1 1.6 2.0 
Norfolk 1 1,710 .1 1.4 2.0 
2 1,370 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Table 8. Transporta tion/Rec« sipt Time, Da vs. 
E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined each segment of the reguisition 
pipeline. This examination revealed a distribution process 
which is complex because its numerous segments and nodes are 
controlled by different organizations: reguisition submission 
is controlled by the industrial activity; ICP stock 
determination is controlled by either the Navy (SPCC or ASO) 
or DLA (DGSC, DISC, DESC); stock selection, packaging and 
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transportation are controlled by DLA; local delivery is 
controlled by DLA; finally, local receiving procedures are 
managed by the shipyards. Each of these organizations has 
different missions, methods of evaluation and independent data 
systems. Nonetheless, data was obtained for each segment and 
was presented in Tables 4 through 8. That information has 
been summed to get the number of days to process a reguisition 
through the system. The segments and the sums are presented 
Table 9. 
(IP6 = ALL) (IPG = 1) (IPG = 2) 
SEGMENT NSY NORFOLK NSY NORFOLK NSY  NORFOLK 
Submission Time: 4.0 3.8 3.5 2.4 4.5 3.4 
Referral Time: .8 .3 1.2 .3 .5 .2 
Stock Pt Processing: 3.2 4.1 1.0 1.0 2.1 1.8 
Transportation/Receipl t: 1.0 1.1 .4 .1 1.1 1.0 
9.3      6.1    3.8     8.2    6.4 
Table 9.  Total Average Reguisition Times. 
On average it takes all shipyard IPG-1 reguisitions 6.1 
days and IPG-2 reguisitions 8.2 days from submission to 
receipt. If the supply system is trying to improve on these 
times than they may have to streamline the operation further. 
Several large companies such as Motorola have focused on 
satisfying their customers by reducing logistics costs and 
processing time as a way of increasing their guality and 
responsiveness. They have determined that the more steps and 
"handoffs" involved in the process, the greater the potential 
for delays, gueues and costs (Denton, 1991). 
Finally, if the normal processing time for a IPG-1 
reguisition is 6.1 days on average and the customer puts a RDD 
on the reguisition for 3 or 4 days, then the automated system 
can not respond on average guickly enough to meet this. The 
only way to avoid this is to manually process reguisitions 
with short RDDs (i.e., those allowing less than the UMMIPS 
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Standard for processing) as a Bearer Walk-Through or pass it 
over the phone to the ICP for expedited processing. For other 
RDDs if material is available for issue, the system as 
designed should be able to respond to meet the needs of its 
customers. 
In the next chapter an analysis is made to show various 
SPCC industrial support initiatives to meet the customer's RDD 
when stock is unavailable or when the estimated availability 
date for material is greater than the RDD specified by the 
customer. 
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IV.  SPCC INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT INITIATIVES 
As identified in Chapter I, industrial customers have 
indicated that SPCC should be buying and issuing material to 
meet the RDD. As a result of this requirement and in view of 
reduced inventory levels, SPCC has taken the initiative to 
ensure that appropriate supply actions are taken to fill 
backordered industrial requisitions being held in open status 
where the Estimated Availability Date (EAD) is beyond the RDD. 
In the past there was no procedure in place to ensure that 
these requisitions were filled on-time. By doing this the 
command hopes to avoid cancellations and realize sales which 
supports the Stock Fund and supplements SPCC's surcharge. 
Moreover, hopefully, "goodwill" will be established between 
SPCC and its customers as both work together to support the 
Naval Operating Forces. 
In SPCC's Fiscal Year 1994 Strategic Plan goals have been 
established which provide a comprehensive strategy for the 
years ahead. To support the concerns of the industrial 
customers, Tactical Goal #10, "Buy To RDD", was developed. 
This goal stated, "SPCC will develop and implement procedures 
to purchase industrial support material to meet the RDD of 
industrial customers' requisitions". This broad goal assumes 
that the industrial customers' assigned RDDs are achievable 
and set rationally. SPCC's industrial customers include all 
shipyards, air stations, NADEPs, Weapons Stations, SIMAs and 
overseas ship repair facilities (SRF). 
As directed by the Tactical Goal, Code 03 has been 
specifically assigned the responsibility for managing this 
effort. Two divisions in this code actively involved in the 
day to day efforts to satisfy the needs of the industrial 
customers are Code 0311 (Industrial Expediters) and Code 033F 
(RDD Managers). 
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This chapter first reviews the procedures initiated as a 
result of Tactical Goal #10 to meet RDD and discusses their 
effectiveness. Next an examination of the factors used in 
determining SPCC's surcharge is discussed. Finally, a lost 
sales analysis is done to show the financial impact on SPCC 
from not meeting RDDs for Naval shipyards. 
A. SPCC RDD MANAGEMENT 
A significant step taken by SPCC to support the RDD 
Management process was the implementation of SPCC Internal 
Notice 4440. This provided a procedural change to SPCCINST 
4440.467B of 22 Jul 87 which is the Requisition Processing 
Decision Matrix used by IMs to process requisitions. Before 
the Notice, RDD did not take a prominent role in making 
requisition processing decisions; only industrial IPG 1 
(Priority 01,02 and 03) work stoppage requisitions could be 
spot procured according to the Matrix. 
The Notice directs that all IPG 1 and 2 industrial 
requisitions in backorder status will be reviewed by RDD 
Managers and IMs on a regular basis. For backorders that 
cannot be filled to meet RDD, a spot procurement/spot repair 
will be processed after all other methods of RDD fulfillment 
(referral, reconsignment) have been examined and found to be 
unsuccessful in meeting RDD. If the requisition does not 
provide a RDD (i.e., the RDD field is blank) a RDD will be 
computed in accordance with DOD 4140.1-R. 
The first step in the process occurs when SPCC's 
INDUSTRIAL UIC CULPRIT/FOCUS Program queries the UICP Open 
Requisition File for requisitions where the Estimated 
Availability Date (EAD) is greater than the RDD. A hardcopy 
report is generated by LRC (Local Routing Code), which is 
material grouped by Item Manager (IM), then it is routed to 
the Industrial Expediters in Code 0311.  The Expediters will 
54 
call the industrial customer and verify the RDD and, where 
applicable, make modifications to the requisition's RDD upon 
concurrence by the customer. The Expediters will also work 
with the IMs to either reconsign other requisitions to the 
industrial customer or to initiate a cannibalization to meet 
the RDD. Cannibalizations will usually be made from ships 
being decommissioned or from weapons system held at Naval 
Weapons and Ordinance Stations. 
The requisitions which cannot be filled by this means are 
routed to the RDD Managers in Code 033F. The RDD Managers 
options to fill the requisition are either through spot buy or 
spot repair. After actions have been completed to meet the 
RDD, program B04 of the UICP updates the requisitions with the 
new EAD or identifies the activity the requisition has been 
passed to for filling. 
Overall, the RDD Manager's efforts, working in 
conjunction with the IM and Procurement Specialists, are 
paying off, not only to the benefit of SPCC, but also the 
industrial customer. The effectiveness of Code 033F's 
Industrial RDD management efforts are shown in Figures 3 and 
4 for IPG 1 and 2 requisitions. A 1994 goal was established 
to decrease IPG 1 requisitions 20% to 950 and IPG 2 
requisitions 30% to 1,190. In both cases, SPCC has exceeded 
its goals, especially in the case of IPG 1 requisitions which 
have decreased over 50% since the beginning of the year. 
In accordance with SPCC Internal Notice 4440, RDD 
Managers are directed not to initiate spot procurement/spot 
repair action without the concurrence of Cognizant IMs. If a 
spot buy is the agreed upon method to meet the industrial 
customer's RDD then the RDD Manager will prepare a spot buy 
folder with the specific item to be purchased as well as the 
company to be awarded the contract. As a result of the RDD 
Management PAT, a comprehensive checklist of signatures and 
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Steps to perform a spot procurement was put into place to 
eliminate common processing errors and delays. 
IPG-1 Reqns   EAO > RDD 
Month 1994 
Figure 3.  Code 033F IPG-1 Effectiveness 
IPG-2 Reqns   EAD > RDD 
2000 
Month   1994 
Figure 4.  Code 033F IPG-2 Effectiveness. 
Currently, Code 03 is moving from the manual folders to 
using ITIMPS (Integrated Technical Item Management and 
Procurement System). This is an interactive, menu-driven 
system to "speed up" the procurement process by eliminating 
the flow of paperwork. The system allows the contract 
specialists in Code 02 to work on contracts as they are passed 
via the system. The system sequences potential contracts by 
Priority. However, there are subroutines designed to "bump 
up" requirements with short RDDs (Port, 1994).  Using ITIMPS 
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is an effective means for RDD Managers to obtain parts for 
industrial customers by their RDD. 
1. Local Procurement Issues 
As cited previously, industrial activities are reluctant 
to use the procurement services of SPCC, mainly because they 
do not want to lose "control" of the procurement. However, 
SPCCINST 4235.150 (Authority for Local Purchase or Manufacture 
of SPCC Centrally Managed Items) directs industrial customers 
to make every effort to identify requirements in sufficient 
time to allow for routine supply support. Industrial 
activities are authorized to purchase or manufacture material 
locally if all of the following conditions are met: 
(1) Material is required for immediate end use; 
(2) The item, or suitable substitute, is readily 
available from an acceptable commercial source; 
(3) The purchase will not circumvent the provisions of 
the Defense Federal Acquisition manual; 
(4) The purchase will not exceed purchase authority 
limitations set by Field Purchasing or other regulations; 
and 
(5) Adequate quality control standards can be applied 
locally for items involving health, safety or combat 
effectiveness. 
Additionally, the only acceptable means of requesting or 
receiving local purchase authority from the IM (Inventory 
Manager) will be by electronic transmission in accordance with 
assigned Media and Status codes or by message. Telephone 
requests for local purchase will not be accepted. 
In order to determine the responsiveness of SPCC purchase 
support, a hypothetical situation and question was posed to a 
Code 02 (Contracting Group) supervisor who wished to remain 
anonymous. " It is noon on a Monday and a shipyard shop has 
determined after an open and inspect job that it needs a pump 
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by tomorrow morning in order to continue the job. The pump is 
a SPCC-managed item which is currently not in stock, but it is 
available from a company in San Diego. Could SPCC provide the 
procurement services in order to meet the RDD of the shipyard 
and as a result, not lose a sale?" 
The Code 02 Supervisor responded that the contracting 
shop at SPCC could respond, but that it is not "business as 
usual" because it would force adjustments to the work 
schedule. The supervisor went on to say that "the Contract 
Specialists don't approach work stoppages as aggressively as 
a CASREP which would force them to work overtime". 
Other factors which inhibit the contracting effort are 
the constraints placed upon small and large purchases. For 
example, for a purchase over $25,000, an advertisement must be 
made to all potential contractors in a journal such as the 
"Commerce Business Daily" or other media for a minimum of 30 
days. This obviously increases the procurement lead time for 
an item. 
In September 1994, the House and Senate agreed upon a 
landmark reform bill in an effort to streamline the Pentagon's 
procurement system. An important provision of the Bill would 
raise the threshold for making small purchases from $25,000 to 
$100,000. The Bill also includes provisions to establish a 
computerized network for advertising defense contracts. The 
goal is to transform the paperwork-laden process into a guick, 
electronic data interchange between the government and 
business (Navy Times, 1994). This will make the procurement 
process quicker and easier for SPCC and Naval shipyards. 
2. The 80-20 Curve 
Despite the minor shortcomings with local procurement 
issues, RDD management is making an impact as shown earlier in 
Figures 3 and 4. However, when attempting to determine the 
causes for the requisitions which continue to be backordered 
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and the specific NSNs affected, the personnel in Code 033 
could not give a definite answer. They did provide a list of 
common reasons for backordered requisitions and systems with 
parts support problems such as AEGIS, Close-in Weapons System 
(CIWS) and the LM2500 Gas Turbine Engine. The list includes: 
- Forecast lead time was wrong (i.e., too short) 
- Quarterly Demand exceeded past historical Demand 
- High dollar value part sent out for bid 
(min of 90 days) 
- Variabilities in the Repair pipeline;  Repair 
Turn-around Time (RTAT) or survival rate may be 
wrong. 
If Code 033 could provide a further breakdown of the 
continuing backordered requisitions, this would allow for 
management efforts to be directed to those items which would 
have the greatest impact on RDD effectiveness. For example, 
the requisitions still outstanding are either requisitions for 
separate and distinct NSNs or there are groups of requisitions 
for the same NSN. If the latter situation is the case, then 
the requisitions can be divided into NSN categories by 
cumulative percent of total items. This situation creates a 
product/stock phenomenon known as the 80-20 curve. This 
concept which is based on Pareto's Law, states that 80 percent 
of a firm's sales are generated by 20 percent of the product 
line items (Ballou, 1992). By doing this, managers at all 
levels would know at a glance what the problem parts are for 
industrial customers and where to focus their attention. 
B.  DETERMINATION OF SPCC SURCHARGES 
The purpose of the surcharge is to balance total revenue 
with total net operating expenses (Revenue = Expenditures). 
It is the amount added by the ICP to the base price of 
material to cover not only purchase of the material but all 
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costs associated with ordering, holding and delivering the 
material. The formula for determining the surcharge 
percentage markup is: 
Surcharge = Cost of Operating -r Cost of Goods Sold 
As an example, the FY 1995 Composite Surcharge forecasted for 
all SPCC managed material is computed as follows: 
Cost of Operating = $296.2M 
Cost of Goods Sold = $629.6M 
$296.2M/$629.6M = 47.0% 
Some of the factors which impact the amount of the 
surcharge are increased costs and a decreasing sales base. 
Increased costs are attributed to higher costs associated with 
Stock Funding Supply Operations. Some of these include ICP 
Operating Costs, Physical Distribution/Handling Costs and a 
Fair Share of Other Costs such as SPCC salaries. The 
decreasing sales base is a result of Consumable Item Transfers 
to DLA as well as the decrease in the size of the force 
structure. (Vaughn, 1994) 
Table 10 provides an indication of the magnitude of the 
projected decreasing sales base. 
Number of USN Ships Supported 
SPCC Items Centrally Managed 
(Cognizance Groups 1H/3H, 7E/G/H/Z) 
Table 10.  Reductions in Material and Sales Base. 
(From SPCC Strategic Plan FY 1994 Update) 















The various surcharge elements which are used to 
determine the Cost of Operating are listed in Table 11 and 
defined after that. 
SURCHARGE ELEMENTS 
Cost of Operating; 
Line Item 










Table 11.  Surcharge Elements, 
a. SPCC Fair Share of Other Budget Program BP91 Costs: 
These are the costs of operating other NAVSUP activities 
like the FISCs; included in this are salaries and utilities. 
b. DBOF Profit/Losses: This is SPCC's fair share of 
Department of the Navy's profits and losses attributed to 
the Defense Business Operating Fund. 
c. DLA Reimbursement:  SPCC's share of the costs of 
operating the DLA warehouses; includes receiving, issuing 
and transportation. 
d. ICP BP91: These are the cost of operating SPCC; 
includes salaries and utilities. 
e. Depot Washout: This is the amount to buy replacement 
stock for those DLRs determined to be beyond economical 
repair. 
f. stock Losses: To account for the physical damage to 
inventory. 
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g. Carcass Losses; To account for DLRs which have never 
been returned to the supply system. 
h. Obsolescence: A fixed charge against system 
inventory for those items which will lose their utility over 
the life of a supported system. 
i. DMRD Savings: An efficiency savings directed by OSD 
as a result of DMR 971, DOD Financial Systems.  This figure 
as determined by NAVSUP assumes a 1% productivity 
improvement each year until FY 1997. 
Reviewing the information presented so far, two ways to 
lower the surcharge are to decrease the Costs of Operating or 
to increase the Cost of Goods Sold. The next section will 
analyze the impact of lost sales on SPCC and will show the 
benefits of managing shipyard reguirements to RDD to increase 
the Cost of Goods Sold. 
C.  SHIPYARD LOST SALES ANALYSIS 
NAVSUP has directed all industrial activities to submit 
a "record demand only" (Document Identifier Code (DIC) "DHA") 
Transaction Item Report (TIR) to SPCC for each SPCC centrally- 
managed item which had to be purchased or manufactured locally 
because SPCC was out of stock (NAVSUP P-437). From October 
1993 to July 1994, $3.9 million in "DHA" (demand only) 
transactions were submitted for 591 SPCC NSNs by all Naval 
Shipyards (Nordahl, 1994). This data gives an approximate 
indication of financial loss to SPCC for not meeting RDDs, 
keeping in mind that some of these sales could have been 
directed by the Item Manager (IM). On the other hand, some 
activities may be making inaccurate reports or not making 
reports at all. 
In analyzing the data, the premise is that each lost sale 
should have resulted in a sale by SPCC, but the customer chose 
to fill the reguirement with some other means (local purchase 
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or manufacture). The assumption is that the customer chose 
the local option because SPCC could not respond quick enough 
to meet their needs (Port, 1994). This alternative was 
identified in Chapter III where it was noted that several 
shipyard planning supervisors preferred local procurement over 
buying from SPCC. (Losing "control" and "response time" were 
the main reasons.) Furthermore, assume that these sales could 
have been made by SPCC, if spot buy or spot repair methods 
were used to meet RDD (Port, 1994). 
In order to quantify the lost financial benefit to SPCC 
from these lost sales, the variable costs associated with the 
spot buy or spot repair should be compared to the surcharge 
that $3.9M in sales would generate. The difference would be 
the net lost surcharge income. Previous analyses by SPCC Code 
02 indicate that the variable cost per item ordered in a 
contract is $1,521 (Industrial PAT Report, 1994). In 
addition, the surcharge used by SPCC for FY 1994 was 54% 
(Vaughan, 1994). 
The first step is to separate the $3.9M into base and 
surcharge elements: 
Base =      $2.520M 
Surcharge =  $1.361M   (54%) 
Second, Total Variable Cost is estimated to be: 
$1,521   Variable Cost per contract line item 
X 591    Total NSN Hits 
$ .899M   Total Variable Cost 
Third, Lost Surcharge Net Income to SPCC: 
$1.361M  Surcharge from $3.9M in Lost Sales 
- .899M  Total Variable Cost 
$ .462M  Lost Surcharge Net Income 
Although these calculations are simplistic, keeping in 
mind the assumptions made in the very beginning, they do show 
that SPCC can gain financially and possibly reduce the 
surcharge to all customers.   The way to achieve this is 
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through an aggressive and proactive RDD Management program 
with an emphasis on spot buy/spot repair not only for Naval 
Shipyards, but for all industrial customers.  (Nordahl, 1994) 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the initiatives taken by SPCC 
to support their Industrial Customers by managing backordered 
reguisitions to meet RDD. Despite some of the shortcomings of 
the process, these initiatives are making progress in 
satisfying not only the needs of the shipyards but other 
industrial activities as well. For example, as shown in 
Figures 3 and 4, IPG-1 and IPG-2 reguisitions have been 
reduced 50% and 30%, respectively since the beginning of 1994. 
Additionally, SPCC's surcharge and the financial impact of 
lost sales on this surcharge was reviewed. It was shown that 
if SPCC can make sales that would have been lost previously, 
then this financial gain can have the potential of lowering 
the surcharge for all customers. 
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V.  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis was to examine material 
support provided by the supply system to the Navy's shipyards. 
As discussed in Chapter I, a survey taken of all Navy 
industrial customers revealed that NAVSUP should be buying and 
issuing material to meet the RDD. To accomplish this goal, 
NAVSUP directed the formation of several Process Action Teams 
to improve its industrial support and to develop a RDD-based 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). The current MOE uses the date 
the material was shipped to determine on-time effectiveness. 
It does not take into consideration the transportation and 
receipt take-up segments of the requisition pipeline. 
Chapter II described the material forecasting procedures 
used by Navy shipyard planners several years before a ship or 
submarine is scheduled to begin an overhaul. This procedure 
uses a Probability of Use (POU) factor to determine Mandatory 
and Contingent material requirements. These forecasts are 
provided to the supply system so that stock can be made 
available to support the future requirements. Two case 
studies were used to illustrate the shipyards' poor 
forecasting accuracy for both Navy-managed material and DLA- 
managed material. 
Chapter II also introduced the Advanced Industrial 
Management Program, known as AIM. This program addresses many 
of the problems identified by Coopers and Lybrand in their 
1985 assessment of Naval shipyards. One of the subsystems of 
AIM which will help in managing and forecasting material for 
all shipyard jobs is MR (Material Requirements). This system 
should greatly improve PERA material forecasting by providing 
a corporate data base of material usage, technical 
documentation and lessons learned. 
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Chapter III examined the material requisition pipeline 
including the shipyard's requisition submission process; 
passing actions by the POE and ICP stock determination; the 
issuing stock point's processing of the requisition; and 
transportation to the shipyard and material receipt by the 
shipyard. This chapter also discussed the DOD UMMIPS time 
standards which are service level targets to complete each 
segment of the requisition pipeline. In order to determine 
how successful each part of the pipeline was in meeting these 
standards for Navy shipyards, the average and median times to 
complete each segment were compared with the UMMIPS standards. 
It was found on average that the supply system can respond 
within the UMMIPS standards if requisitions are submitted in 
a timely manner with the RDD reasonably assigned. 
Next, Chapter IV discussed the initiatives taken by SPCC 
to ensure that requisitions, held in open status with an 
Estimated Availability Date (EAD) greater then the RDD, are 
filled. This discussion focused on the options available to 
the RDD expediters and managers including cannibalization, 
requisition reconsignment, spot buy and spot repair. 
Chapter IV also examined SPCC's surcharge and conducted 
a lost sales analysis to determine the financial magnitude of 
not meeting the RDDs of shipyard customers. By SPCC being 
more proactively involved with the customer, sales could be 
made which would allow a reduction in the surcharge SPCC 
applies to all of its customers. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
The following is a listing of the conclusions derived 
from this research. 
1. Shipyard material forecasting procedures which 
generate PPRs and SPRs are inaccurate and cause the 
system to order and hold material that is often not 
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requisitioned by the shipyards. Additionally, if 
material is needed after the start of the availability 
and it was not forecasted as being needed, then there may 
not be enough items in the supply system to support the 
demand. 
2. Navy and DLA ICPs cannot automatically match 
preplanned requirements against the shipyard requisitions 
to determine match rate accuracy. 
3. Shipyard material usage data is not forwarded to the 
shipyard's planning activity or effectively used by the 
shipyard's Supply Department to plan future requirements. 
4. When the Material Requirements (MR) subsystem of the 
Advanced Industrial Management (AIM) Program is 
implemented, it will help shipyard planners make more 
accurate material requirements forecasts by allowing them 
to have access to historical usage data in the shipyard 
corporate database. 
5. The NAVSUP Corporate Information System does not 
accurately show the on-time performance of shipyard 
requisitions for SPCC and DLA managed material. The way 
the system currently works is that once "AS1" status is 
received in the Transaction History File (THF) for a 
requisition then the requisition is considered "filled". 
If the date of the AS1 is on or before the RDD, then it 
is considered to be on-time. This erroneously indicates 
that the supply system is meeting the RDD when, in fact, 
the customer still has not received the material. In 
addition, the number of RODs (Report of Discrepancy) 
submitted by Norfolk NSY for material missing in transit 
(which never arrives) is a problem for the customer, but 
CIS does not reflect this. CIS reports these as on-time 
filled requisitions. 
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6. Shipyard Planners and Supply Department personnel are 
not aware of the UMMIPS standards to complete each 
segment of the requisition pipeline. As a result, there 
is a propensity to assign unrealistic RDDs to the 
requisitions. This is compounded by the fact that it 
takes several days on average for the shipyard to process 
and submit a requisition to the supply system when the 
standard is one day. 
7. For material known to be in stock in the supply 
system, if a requisition is submitted in accordance with 
the UMMIPS standards and a realistic RDD is assigned, 
taking into account the times for each segment of the 
requisition pipeline, the system can respond on time. 
However, for requisitions with a RDD shorter than the 
standard (i.e., two to three days), then manual 
intervention by SPCC or DLA is required to assure 
delivery on or before the RDD. For material known to be 
out of stock, SPCC's RDD management effort is a 
significant step in the right direction to satisfy the 
needs of its industrial customers. Through proactive 
involvement, SPCC now is making sales which in the past 
would have possibly been lost. This is evident by the 
decreases in IPG-1 and IPG-2 requisitions where the EAD 
> RDD. 
8. Under the Guaranteed Traffic contract, normal 
deliveries are Monday through Friday (less holidays). If 
a customer assigns a RDD which happens to fall on a 
Saturday, then the material may not be received until 
Monday. In this instance, if the customer does not use 
some thought in assigning an RDD keeping that information 
in mind, on-time delivery may not be possible. 
9. The guiding instruction for UMMIPS within the Navy, 
OPNAV Instruction 4614.IF, is outdated and does not 
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reflect the time standards as found in DOD Regulation 
4140.1-R. 
10. The Contracting Group (Code 02) at SPCC does not 
work industrial workstoppage requirements as aggressively 
as it does for CASREP requirements. This has led to the 
general attitude among shipyard planners to avoid SPCC 
and use local procurement instead. The main reason given 
by several planners was that "control" was lost by using 
SPCC's services. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are proposed to further 
improve the Navy's supply system support of the shipyard's 
mission. 
1. Upon completion of the Work Definition Conference 
(WDC), the shipyards should provide both SPCC, DLA and 
the appropriate PERA a listing of all required 
maintenance material. SPCC and DLA personnel can use the 
lists to make a better match with PPR and SPR files and 
PERA can use the data to validate forecasting procedures. 
2. SPCC should work with DLA representatives from the 
Industrial Forecasting Support Group (IFSG) to share 
information and solutions to increase the automated match 
rate between forecasted requirements and drawdown 
requisitions. One method to increase the match rate now 
is to increase the number of possible ways to match an 
industrial requisition to the PPR/SPR. For example, 
instead of matching on all five elements, various 
combinations from one to five should be selected and 
matched accordingly. DLA is testing this concept by 
developing a PC-based system called the SPR Automated 
Information System which will use information taken from 
their SAMMS (Standard Automated Material Management 
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System) database. DLA will use the data from this new 
SPR system to monitor the SPR program as well as to 
provide feedback to industrial activities to assist in 
forecast improvement. 
3. SPCC should assign an RDD manager to each of the 
industrial activities to be the "one face" representative 
for parts support similar to DLA's Industrial Forecasting 
Support Group (IFSG). Then, whenever any parts support 
problem arises, the shipyard can talk directly with their 
designated point-of-contact to obtain all the answers 
quickly instead of taking the time to call multiple 
people. In the meantime, SPCC needs to advertise their 
RDD Management concept to the shipyards. Many planners 
the author spoke with were not aware of SPCC's efforts to 
assist them in obtaining material. 
4. In order to improve assignment of RDDs, as well as to 
monitor and improve requisition submission times, the 
following steps should be implemented: 
a. Review daily a sample of requisitions by the 
shipyard Supply Officer or the Deputy to assure realistic 
RDDs are assigned. 
b. For manually generated JMLs, Supply Department 
personnel should change the Julian Date of the 
requisition to match the Julian Date it is transmitted to 
the supply system. Information should also be provided 
to the workcenter about the action taken. 
c. In order for shipyard managers and planners to 
become more familiar with UMMIPS standards, the Supply 
Department should develop decision charts or a simplified 
brochure which outlines the rules of the priority system 
and the time standards for each segment of the 
requisition pipeline. Training sessions which explain 
these decision aids and stress the importance of timely 
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requisition submission can help improve the performance 
of all shipyard personnel involved in the process. 
5. OPNAVINST 4614.IF should be cancelled and a new 
instruction issued which reflects the UMMIPS standards as 
directed in DOD 4140.1-R. 
6. NAVSUP should continue efforts to update the RDD On- 
Time MOE in the CIS to reflect the entire requisition 
pipeline. In the meantime, the current reports should 
not be used as a precise MOE. Since shipyards are 
apparently submittinq their receipt information in a 
timely manner, this information can possibly be added to 
the CIS now in order to provide complete on-time 
performance. Other industrial activities can be added 
later when their receipt procedures improve. 
Additionally, to overcome the limitations caused by usinq 
Intransit Data Cards (IDC) to match with the "D6S" 
receipt report, NAVSUP should have SPCC discontinue usinq 
them. This would allow more requisitions to be used in 
obtaininq MILSTEP data for the final seqment of the 
requisition pipeline. 
7. Since RDD is becominq one of the prime factors in 
determininq supply system responsiveness, the potential 
exists for abuse by orderinq activities. This can occur 
when orderinq activities assiqn unrealistic RDDs which do 
not take into consideration the UMMIPS standards for each 
seqment of the requisition pipeline. For example, if the 
assiqned RDD is less than the UMMIPS standards, manual 
intervention at the ICP and ISP is often required to 
ensure that material arrives by the RDD. If orderinq 
activities are charqed a flat surcharqe for the increased 
service, this should cause these activities to think 
throuqh the process and assiqn a "realistic" RDD which 
meets the requisitioner's needs. 
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8. As another means not to lose industrial sales, SPCC 
Code 02 (Contracting Group) should provide the same 
service level in meeting workstoppage requisitions for 
industrial activities as it does with CASREP requisitions 
for Fleet units. The increased sales should offset any 
increase in overhead for providing this service. 
In closing, since the focus of this thesis was on the 
concerns for Naval shipyards, it did not address the concerns 
of the other Navy industrial activities, namely Shore 
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), Naval Aviation 
Depots (NADEP), Naval Weapons Stations (NWS), Naval Ordinance 
Stations (NAVORDSTA) and overseas Ship Repair Facilities 
(SRF). In addition, an examination of industrial support 
procedures at the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) Philadelphia 
was not conducted. Comparable research as was done in this 
thesis should be done for each of these customer categories. 
It would greatly assist NAVSUP's efforts to improve its 
responsiveness to all industrial customers. 
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